In this paper we consider cooperative transferable utility games with limited communication structure, called graph games. Agents are able to cooperate only if they can communicate directly or indirectly with each other. For the class of acyclic graph games the average tree solution has recently been proposed. It was proven that the average tree solution is a core element if the game exhibits super-additivity. We show that the condition of super-additivity can be relaxed to a weaker condition, which admits for a natural interpretation. Moreover, we introduce the concept of subcore, which is a subset of the core, always contains the average tree solution, and therefore is a non-empty refinement of the core.
Introduction
In many economic situations agents are able to obtain more profits or save costs by cooperation. For example, by sharing certain facilities (catering, security, communication systems, transportation) firms may obtain higher total payoffs. The total maximum additional payoff a subgroup of agents, also called a coalition, can obtain from cooperation is called its worth. If the worth of a coalition can be freely distributed amongst its members (transferable utility), the problem becomes how much payoff every agent (player) should get. A classical set-valued solution is the core, see Gillies [3] , being the set of payoff distributions (payoff vectors) at which the worth of the whole set of players (the grand coalition) is distributed amongst the players (efficiency) and no coalition receives less than its worth (non-domination). If a payoff vector is not an element of the core, some coalitions can do better than that by their own. The most well-known single-valued solution is the Shapley value, see Shapley [6] . At the Shapley value every agent receives the (weighted) average of all his marginal contributions to any coalition that he is a member of. The Shapley value, however, may not be an element of the core.
In this research we study cooperative games with limited communication structure represented by an undirected graph. These so-called graph games were introduced by Myerson [5] . A group of players is only able to cooperate if they can communicate directly or indirectly with each other. The best-known single-valued solution for such games is the Myerson value, being characterized by efficiency and fairness. In Borm et al. [1] the so-called positional value is proposed. This value is characterized by efficiency and balanced total threats, see Slikker [7] . In Herings et al. [4] the average tree solution is introduced for the class of acyclic graph games. The average tree solution is characterized by efficiency and component fairness. Component fairness means that deleting a link between two players yields for both resulting components the same average loss in payoff, whereas fairness says that deleting a link gives the same loss in payoff for both end points of the link. The average tree solution is the average of some specific marginal contribution vectors. For super-additive acyclic graph games all these vectors lie in the core and therefore also the average tree solution is an element of the core. For this class of games the Myerson value and the position value may not be elements of the core.
In this paper we give a condition for the characteristic function that is weaker than super-additivity to make the average tree solution be an element of the core. Moreover, we refine the core to a smaller subset, called the subcore, and show that for the class of acyclic graph games satisfying this weaker condition for the characteristic function the average tree solution is always an element of the subcore and therefore that the subcore is a non-empty refinement of the core. Section 2 introduces the class of graph games. Section 3 relates the average tree solution to the core and Section 4 introduces the subcore.
Preliminaries
We consider cooperative games with limited communication structure, called graph games, as has been introduced by Myerson [5] . A graph game is represented by a triple (N, v, E) , where N is a finite set of n players, v is a characteristic function that assigns the worth to coalitions, and
The pair (N, E) is called an (undirected) graph with N the set of nodes, being the players of the game, and with E the collection of edges (links) between the nodes. In case 
A graph is said to be acyclic when it does not contain any cycle. A set of nodes K ⊂ N is said to be connected in the graph (N, E), if for any two distinct nodes i, j ∈ K there exists a sequence (i 1 , . . . , i k ) of nodes in K satisfying i 1 
The collection of connected subsets of K in the subgraph (K, E(K)) of a graph (N, E) is denoted by C E (K) and the collection of components of (K, E(K)) is denoted by C E m (K). In this paper it is assumed without loss of generality that in a graph game (N, v, E) the set N is always connected in the graph (N, E), i.e., N ∈ C E (N ). Due to the limited communication, members of a coalition S ∈ 2 N are able to cooperate only if all members of S can communicate directly or indirectly with each other, i.e., S ∈ C E (N ). For S ∈ C E (N ), the worth v(S) is the maximum amount of payoff a coalition S can obtain for its members. Concerning the characteristic function v, the graph game is said to exhibit super-additivity
is the set of efficient payoff vectors that are not dominated by any connected coalition,
The core of a game (N, v) with full communication is denoted by C(N, v), i.e.,
Notice that the core C(N, v, E) of a graph game (N, v, E) equals the core C(N, v E ) of the so-called restricted game (N, v E ) with full communication, defined by Myerson [5] as 
, µ(N, v, E) = ψ(N, v E ). The Myerson value of a graph game (N, v, E)
is not always an element of the core, even not if the graph (N, E) is acyclic and the game itself is super-additive. From Demange [2] it is known that the core of a super-additive acyclic graph game is non-empty because it contains several specific marginal contribution vectors, but not always all.
The Average Tree Solution and the Core
For the class of graph games the average tree solution was introduced by Herings et al. [4] . To describe the average tree solution we first give some definitions concerning directed graphs.
, D is a set of ordered pairs of nodes. An ordered pair of nodes is called an arc. Clearly, an arborescence has exactly one node that no arc enters, which is called the root, and there is a unique directed path from the root to each node. For a given arborescence (N, D), for each node i ∈ N we define its sets of successors and descendants as
and
respectively. We also define inductively the height τ (i) of node i ∈ N as follows:
For a given acyclic graph game (N, v, E) the tree solution, denoted by x r , with respect to node r ∈ N , is defined as follows.
Step 1: Make an arborescence D r with node r as root. Set t := 0.
Step 2: If there is no node i ∈ N with τ (i) = t, then terminate.
Step 3: For each node i ∈ N with τ (i) = t set
(3.4)
Step 4: Set t := t + 1 an go to Step 2. Since the graph (N, E) is acyclic, the arborescence (N, D r ) with root r is uniquely determined. More precisely, if (i 1 , . . . , i k ) is a path in (N, E) connecting node i 1 = r with
and therefore It has been shown in Herings et al. [4] that the average tree solution can be axiomatized by efficiency and component fairness. The latter property says that if an edge is deleted the average loss for the two resulting components is the same, where the average is taken over all players in the component.
For a given acyclic connected undirected graph (N, E), let δ(S), S ∈ C E (N ), be the set of edges in E having one end node in S and the other end node outside S, i.e.,
Deleting an edge a of δ(S) results in two disjoint connected node sets, one containing the set S. We denote the component that does not contain the set S by T S (a). We call T S (a) a satellite of S. See Figure 2 . The set S is connected to satellite T S (a) through the edge a. Notice that the union of S and all its satellites equals the set of all nodes. The next theorem gives a sufficient condition such that the average tree solution is an element of the core.
Theorem 3.3. Suppose the acyclic graph game (N, v, E) satisfies
v(N \ T S (a)) ≥ v(S) + ∑ e∈δ(S)\{a} v(T S (e)) for all S ∈ C E (N ) and a ∈ δ(S). (3.8)

Then the average tree solution AT (N, v, E) is an element of the core, in particular the core C(N, v, E) is nonempty.
Proof. We first prove that for every r ∈ N the tree solution x r with respect to node r is an element of C(N, v, E). Take any node r ∈ N and let D r and x r be the arborescence with root r and the corresponding tree solution, respectively. Then we have des(r) = N , which implies x r (N ) = v(N ) from (3.6). We will show that
Take any S ∈ C E (N ). When the root r is an element of S, by the construction of the tree solution, x
r satisfies
for all a ∈ δ(S), see (3.5). By (3.7) the tree solution x r then satisfies
v(T S (a)) ≥ v(S).
When the root r is not an element of S, r is in T S (a) for some unique a ∈ δ(S). By construction
and for all e ∈ δ(S) \ {a} it holds that See for illustration the connected node sets circumscribed by a dotted circle in Figure 2 . Therefore, by (3.8), we obtain
Hence x r ∈ C(N, v, E) for every r ∈ N . Since AT (N, v, E) is the average of all tree solutions, and the core is a convex set, the average tree solution AT (N, v, E) is an element of the core.
Condition (3.7) states that the worth of the grand coalition should be at least equal to the worth of any connected coalition plus the sum of the worths of all its satellites. Condition (3.8) states that for any satellite of a connected coalition it holds that the worth of the players outside this satellite is at least equal to the worth of this coalition plus the sum of the worths of its other satellites. ) with respect to node r can be explicitly written as follows,
Hence, for j ∈ N , the jth component of the average tree solution of the graph game (N, v, E) is equal to
The first term between brackets reflects how much node j contributes when he is joining all his satellites together, while the second term between brackets describes how much he contributes for linking a node in one of his satellites to the other satellites. The number 
|T
{j} (a)| is the number of players in the satellite that is connected to node j through link a ∈ δ({j}).
Herings et al. [4] show that for the class of super-additive acyclic graph games the average tree solution is always an element of the core. The next lemma shows that super-additivity implies conditions (3.7) and (3.8). (N, v, E) satisfies both conditions (3.7) and (3.8).
Lemma 3.5. A super-additive acyclic graph game
Proof. Take any S ∈ C E (N ) and let
where we use the convention that T 0 = ∅. From super-additivity it follows that for h = 1, . . . , k
From this it follows that for all
from which (3.7) follows. To prove condition (3.8), take any a ∈ δ(S) and let the edges
which implies (3.8).
Note that the conditions (3.7) and (3.8) do not impose any lower bound condition on v(T ) if the set N \ T is not a satellite of any connected set. This fact is the reason that conditions (3.7) and (3.8) are weaker than the condition of super-additivity. For example, consider the case of four players and take E = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}}, then super-additivity requires that it must hold that v({2}) + v({3}) ≤ v({2, 3}). Since {1, 4} is not a satellite of {2, 3}, this condition is not present in (3.7) or (3.8). If E = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}}, i.e., a star graph, then super-additivity requires v({1}) + v({j}) ≤ v({1, j}) for all j ̸ = 1. Since the set N \ {1, j} is not a satellite for any j ̸ = 1, these conditions are not present in (3.7) or (3.8), either.
Although all tree solutions are extreme points of the core, it is not the case that the core is always equal to the convex hull of all tree solutions. For example, if the game is convex, i.e., v(S)
, then all n! marginal contribution vectors are extreme points of the core and the number of different marginal contribution vectors is typically much larger than the number of different tree solutions, which is at most n. 
Subcore
In this section we introduce a refinement of the core of an acyclic graph game. From conditions (3.7) and (3.8) we see that when an acyclic graph game (N, v, E) satisfies these conditions, then for every S ∈ C E (N ) it holds that
This motivates us to refine the core of an acyclic graph game as follows. Let us denote the right hand side of (4.1) by w(S) with the convention that w(N ) = v(N ). 
By definition it holds that the subcore is a subset of the core. More precisely, a payoff vector is an element of the subcore if the grand coalition receives its worth (x(N ) = v(N ), efficiency) and for every other connected coalition S it holds that (i) S receives at least what it can get on its own (x(S) ≥ v(S), core), (ii) S receives at least what it contributes when it joins its satellites to form the grand coalition (
, and (iii) S receives at least what it contributes to the other satellites before a satellite of S joins to form the grand coalition (
, for all a ∈ δ(S)). The idea is that the satellites of a connected set S of players need S to form the grand coalition, so that S can claim a payoff at least equal to what it then contributes. The lowest of these contributions (w(S)) is the least what coalition S wants to receive. The next theorem states that all such claims can be honored in the sense that the subcore of an acyclic graph game satisfying conditions (3.7) and (3.8) is nonempty because it always contains the average tree solution. The theorem follows immediately from (4.1). Therefore on the class of acyclic graph games satisfying conditions (3.7) and (3.8) the subcore is a nonempty refinement of the core. Moreover, the tree solution with respect to any node, which is an extreme point of the core, remains an element of the subcore, and hence is an extreme point of the subcore.
The next example is a graph game with player set N = {1, 2, 3} having limited communication structure represented by the graph in Figure 3 and is shown in Figure 4 for a = 0.8 and b = 0.9. The three tree solutions x r , r ∈ N , are 
